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DPT VACCINE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY: CHIPPING
AWAY AT STRICT LIABILITY TO SAVE THE PRODUCT
NINA H. COMPTON* and J. DOUGLAS COMPTON**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A vaccine liability crisis that threatened our supply of childhood vaccines
may have been averted by Congressional passage and funding of the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVI)' and recent court decisions
removing unlimited strict products liability for vaccine manufacturers.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories
recently rejected the risk-modified market-share liability theory for DPT
vaccine manufacturers. The court rejected collective manufacturer liability
theories by focusing on public policy and health considerations surrounding the DPT vaccine and recognizing the withdrawal phenomenon that
has left only two commercial entities producing the DPT vaccine at the
present time.' While federal preemption of traditional state law tort claims
was not recognized in Shackil,4 the court did acknowledge potential federal
preemption of a products liability claim for defective design by inadequate
warning.' Whether the DPT vaccine has received the unavoidably, unsafe
product classification under comment k of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A 6 is open to interpretation after ShackiP and White v. Wyeth
Laboratories' and the NCVI. This article addresses the retreat from
unlimited strict liability for DPT vaccine manufacturers, focusing on
Shackil and its implications.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Pertussis and the DPT Vaccine
Children in the United States are required by law to have a series of
immunizations before entering school. These immunizations include polio,
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1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (West Supp. 1988).
2. 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
3. Id. at 167, 561 A.2d at 523.
4. Id. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.
5. Id.
6. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment k (1979).
7. 116 N.J. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.
8. 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748 (1988).
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measles-mumps-rubella (MMR), and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT). 9
While reactions to vaccination are not uncommon, the incidences and
severity of these are a subject of much medical and legal debate. "DPT
vaccine is a biological product made from three separate components:
diptheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid, and pertussis vaccine, each of which
stimulates the production of antibodies that protect the body against
those childhood diseases." 0 Diphtheria and tetanus are adequately treated
and controlled by the injections containing diphtheria and tetanus toxoids,
but it is believed that the addition of the pertussis vaccine to the formula
causes adverse side effects in a small number of treatments."
Pertussis, commonly known as whooping cough, is an acute, highly
contagious infectious respiratory disease of children, of a relatively long
duration.' 2 Pertussis was once a major cause of childhood morbidity and
mortality throughout the world-the incidence often reached 200,000 cases
a year in the 1930's, and reached a maximum
of 265,000 cases and 7,500
3
deaths in the United States in 1943.'
In 1906, French bacteriologists Jules Bordet and Octave Gengou first
isolated the causative bacterium of pertussis."' While there were early
attempts to immunize against this disease, it was not until 1922 that a
Danish physician, Thorvald Madsen, reported any success.'" In the late
1940's, the clinical use of pertussis vaccine became routine in this country.
Since 1947, the medical community has recommended the administration
of the pertussis vaccine through a composite absorbed triple vaccine,
16
DPT.
The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that a child receive
his first DPT shot at two months of age. "Additional doses of DPT
are recommended at 4, 6 and 18 months and a final dose between 48
and 84 months of age.' ' 7 Recent data on the clinical efficacy of the
pertussis vaccine indicate that seventy to ninety percent of those who
have had at least three doses of vaccine are protected from the risk of
pertussis.S1

While minor reactions including moderate pain, swelling and fever
occur on occasion, neurological damage attributed to pertussis vaccination

9. Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis: Guidelinesfor Vaccine Prophylaxis and Other Preventative
Measures, 30:32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 392.
10. Shackil, 116 N.J. at 165, 561 A.2d at 521.
11. R. FEIGIN & J. CHERRY, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2268 (2d ed. 1987)
("Most common adverse reactions to DPT are more likely to be due to the pertussis component
rather than to the toxoid components").
12. Cherry, The Epidemiology of Pertussis and Pertussis Immunization in the United Kingdom
and the United States: A Comparative Study, 14 CURRENT PROBS. IN PEDIATRICS 7 (1984).
13. J. SurrH, A TREATISE ON THE DISEASES OF CH.IDREN (7th ed. 1980).
14. H. COULTER & B. FISHER, DPT: A SHOT IN THE DAiu? (1985).
15. T. Madsen, Whooping Cough: Its Bacteriology, Diagnosis, Prevention and Treatment, 192
B. MED. & SURGICAL J. 50 (1922).
16. Cherry, supra note 12, at 30.
17. Pertussis Vaccine, 74 PEDIATICS 303, 304 (1984).
18. Pertussis Surveillance, 1979-1981, 31:25 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 333
(1982).
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is the major risk considered today when the hazards and benefits of
pertussis immunization are analyzed. 19 Encepthalopathy is the commonly
used term to describe neurological events which may follow pertussis
immunization. The most extensive case-controlled study to date on pertussis immunization and central nervous system damage is the British
Childhood Encepthalopathy Study (BCES).20 This study evaluated all
children from two to thirty-six months of age who were admitted to
hospitals due to central nervous system disorders from 1976-1979. Hospital
authorities concluded that there was an increased incidence of encephalopathy among children previously vaccinated with DPT. The frequency
of serious acute disorders was estimated to be one in 110,000 doses of
DPT, and the frequency of permanent damage was one in 310,000 doses.
This study led to the estimation that encephalitis with residual effects
will occur 3.2 times per million doses, an estimated 43.2 cases in the

2
United States per year. '

Medical research estimates that the attack rate of pertussis would be
178-fold higher if DPT immunizations were not given. As part of this
increase, severe neurological illness with permanent residual damage would
occur four times more frequently if no DPT immunizations were performed.22 Analysis of the benefits, risks and. costs of pertussis immunization demonstrate considerable economic and disease reduction benefit
associated with pertussis vaccination. A recent study has shown the benefits
of the nation's immunization program in reporting that cases of pertussis
in 1934 numbered 265,269, with 7,518 deaths, to 2,276 cases and 12
deaths in 1984.23 Notwithstanding the risk of occasional reaction and
potential serious injury on rare occasion, the medical profession continues
to recommend DPT vaccination because of its greater benefit than risk
to the individual child and to society.24
B.

Vaccine Manufacturers
The manufacture of the DPT vaccine with the whole-cell organism of
pertussis and inactivated toxines of diphtheria and tetanus began in 1940
with the product, Triojen, produced by Parke-Davis. 25 Thereafter, Wyeth,

19. Cherry, supra note 12, at 51.
20. ALDERSALE, BELLMAN & RAWSON, THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD ENCEPHALOPATHY STUDY IN
WHOOPING COUGH: REPORTS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINES AND THE JOINT COMMITTEE

AND IMMUNIZATION, Department of Health and Social Security, Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, London (1981).
21. National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearings Before the Senate Committee
of Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1984); see also Tower v. Lederle
Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1986). cert denied, 485 U.S. 442 (1988).
22. Hinman & Koplan, Pertussis and Pertussis Vaccine: Reanalysis of Benefits, Risks and Costs,
251 J. A.M.A. 3109 (1984).
ON VACCINATION

23.

STAYF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMIrTEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
99TH CONG. 2D SEss., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 9-10 (Comm. Print

ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

1986) (hereinafter Comm. Print) (see other reductions in diseases in diphtheria, tetanus and polio).
24. "Continued use of our present vaccines, with careful attention to possible contraindications
seems the only prudent course to follow." Hinman & Koplan, supra note 22, at 3113.
25. Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Squibb/Connaught and Lederle Laboratories were the primary United
States manufacturers of DPT vaccine until approximately 1983, when
Wyeth stopped production, and Squibb/Connaught interrupted production
because of product liability exposure and rising insurance costs. 26 A
27
different type of DPT vaccine containing a split-cell pertussis component
was manufactured by Eli Lilly & Company from 1967 to 1975, when
Eli Lilly left the vaccine business. 28 Wyeth had purchased the right to
produce Eli Lilly's product Tri-Solgen but could not obtain licensing
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for its own split-cell

product .29
In Japan, an acellular pertussis vaccine has been used for mass immunization since the fall of 1981.0 Although the Japanese use more than
one acellular vaccine, field studies between 1978 and 1981 involving 5,000
children revealed that the Japanese acellular vaccine was as effective as
the conventional whole-cell vaccine and also produced fewer side effects.
However, Japan uses a different immunization schedule than the United
States, beginning immunization with only one dose at less than two years
of age.
To assess the effectiveness of the acellular vaccine, United States scientists collaborated with European researchers in a Swedish study involving
a clinical trial of 2,000 to 3,000 children immunized with two acellular
pertussis vaccines. 3 The results are not conclusive of the benefits of the
acellular pertussis vaccine over the whole-cell pertussis vaccine currently
produced in the United States and discontinued in Sweden in 1979.32 It
should be noted that whooping cough was considered to be endemic in
Sweden in 1987 after the discontinuance of their general vaccination
program in 1979 because of public concern about rare severe adverse
events.33
III.

RELAXATION OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR DPT
MANUFACTURERS

Vaccine manufacturers have been alarmed over the six-fold increase in
lawsuits per year from approximately twenty-five in 1980 to approximately
150 in 1985.14 While there are occasional actions in negligence', and

26. See Hinmann, Immunizations: 1984-1985, 20 IMMUNIZATIONS CONF. 7-9 (1985).
27. Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1486 (D. Kan. 1987).
28. Id.
29. See Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 331, 732 P.2d 297, 300 (1987). See also
Note, DPT Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Federal Preemptions Reconsidered, 41 RUTGERS L. REv.
373, 378-79 (1988).
30. Bernier, Current Status of New Pertussis Vaccine Studies, 20TH IMMUNIZATION CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, ATLANTA,

GEORGIA: CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 41-42 (1985).

31. Placebo-Controlled Trial of Two Acellular Pertussis Vaccines in Sweden-Protective Efficacy
and Adverse Events, 1988 LANCET 955-60.
32. Id. at 955.
33. Id.
34. Comm. Print, supra, note 23, at 86.
35. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 485 U.S. 942
(1988).
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breach of express warranty, 6 the spectre of unlimited liability flows from
the product liability actions. The seeds of the doctrine of strict liability
in a defective product case grew from Justice Traynor's concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co..1 7 While concurring in 1944, Justice
Traynor's position moved to the forefront in 1963, when the California
Supreme Court held in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.3" that
the cost of injuries from defective products should be borne by the
manufacturer of such products without proof of negligence.3 9 After Greenman, the law of strict liability governed rather than the law of contract
warranties.10 This began a national trend toward recognition of the strict
liability theory. One year after Greenman, section 402A was added to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 4 Although this section embellished
the strict liability principle, the standard remained the same. The Restatement provides that a seller or manufacturer who sells a product in
an unreasonably dangerous defective condition is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer even though the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product. A product is not unreasonably dangerous if accompanied by
appropriate directions or warnings, and the duty to warn is determined
by the seller's knowledge.
The Restatement went a step further to ensure against the likelihood
of liability for unavoidable injuries resulting from drugs beneficial to
society as a whole. Comment k of section 402A concedes that there are
some products which are incapable of being made safe, and that these
are especially common in the pharmaceutical industry. 42 Prescription drugs
were thought to be and recently have been excepted from the imposition
of strict liability when properly prepared and accompanied by adequate
warnings . 3 Accordingly, vaccine manufacturers often defend against strict
liability claims by arguing that (1) their vaccines are unavoidably unsafe
products which are socially useful but associated with a small degree of
risk, and (2) their vaccines were properly marketed for distribution with
adequate warning. The defendant manufacturer must establish that the
benefits of the product outweigh the inherent risks to obtain the unavoidably unsafe product classification and comment k protection from
strict liability.

36. Grinnel v. Charles Pfizer and Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
37. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)(carbonated beverage bottle exploded for undetermined
reason).
38. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
39. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
40. Greenman's injuries resulted from a piece of wood flying out of a power tool he had
purchased. 59 Cal. 2d at 58, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Greenman brought suit in
negligence and breach of warranty, but the court adopted a strict liability theory for public policy
reasons. Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
42. C. Newdick, Strict Liabilityfor Drugs in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 101 L.Q. REv. 40531 (1985).
43. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424 (1988).
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Even if comment k protection is granted to a polio vaccine or a DPT
vaccine, strict liability can still be imposed if the manufacturer did not
supply an adequate warning with the product. Generally, with prescription
drugs, the manufacturer's duty to warn goes to the prescribing physician,
not the drug recipient, under the Learned Intermediary Doctrine." The
Learned Intermediary Doctrine applies when a patient receives a drug or
vaccination through a physician who explains the risks and benefits and
makes the decision to administer it.41 Where the manufacturer has adequately warned the prescribing physician, the manufacturer will be protected from liability imposed for failure to warn the patient of the risks./4
Vaccines, however, are often used in mass immunization programs which
can remove the individualized medical judgment between the manufacturer
and the ultimate consumer
requiring adequate warning to the consumer
47
by the manufacturer.
Recently, in Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories," the Fifth Circuit did not
recognize a mass immunization exception to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine. In Hurley, the patient-physician relationship existed before and
at the time the immunization was given and the DPT vaccine was
administered under the direction and control of the physician. 49 The
question remained, however, of whether FDA approval of the warning
of Lederle Labs implied federal preemption of a claim of defective warning
when plaintiffs argued that Lederle withheld material information from
the FDA.5 0
Before it reached the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hurley had gained
notoriety as one of the few district court cases holding that federal law
impliedly preempted state law claims of inadequate warning and defective
design.5" The lower court had found that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, the Public Health Service Act, and the Regulations of the FDA
were so comprehensive on DPT labeling to evidence a preemptive intent
to occupy the field and preclude state regulation. 2 The court, thereafter,
considered federal preemption of design defects and similarly found "that
the comprehensive and pervasive nature of the FDCA, the PHSA, and
their respective regulations evidenced preemptive intent so strong that it
precludes any state law determination that DPT is defectively designed.""
In addition to rules and regulations governing licensing, testing, production, distribution, review and approval of all biologic DPT vaccines,

44. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
45. Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1179-80.
51. Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 863 F.2d 1173
(5th Cir. 1988).
52. Id.at 998-99.
53. Id. at 1003.
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the court found dominant an overriding federal interest in promoting
uniformity in the design and manufacture of DPT vaccines.5 4 The concern
of the lower court in Hurley was that a common law determination that
DPT design and manufacture was defective would "seriously and irreconcilably conflict with the federal regulatory scheme and the national
policies of immunization, adequate production, and supply of DPT."' 5
The Fifth Circuit rejected the federal preemption arguments by recognizing that the great majority of United States District Courts addressing
the issue have ruled against preemption. 6 The court reexamined earlier
findings of federal preemption in light of the United States Supreme
Court's analysis in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. 7 which examined federal preemption under FDA testing
and approval of certain medical products.58 The Supreme Court in Hillsborough was reluctant to find federal law implicitly preempting state law
as a general rule,5 9 and gave guidelines for implied preemption, either
"where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to
make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation" or "where the field is one in which 'the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the subject." ' 60 If reexamination of FDA
regulations after Hillsborough were not enough to reject theories of
implied preemption, the Fifth Circuit in Hurley stated that any case for
preemption "is doomed by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-33," because of the express provision in
the Act addressing the application of state law remedies to manufacturers
in the sale of vaccines. 6'
With federal preemption arguments fading and the Court not interpreting the NCVI Act as Congressional occupation of the field of the
nation's immunization program, DPT manufacturers were placed further
at risk under a theory of collectiVe responsibility borrowed from DES
litigation and labelled "Risk-Modified Market Share Liability." This
theory could be applied to all manufacturers of the DPT vaccine where
the plaintiff is unable to prove the identity of the manufacturer whose
vaccine injured the infant. 62 After a comprehensive analysis of collective
responsibility theories and the implications of a further expansion of
strict liability for DPT vaccine manufacturers, the New Jersey Supreme
Court rejected the risk-modified market-share liability theory in Shackil

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
rev'd,

Id. at 1003-04.
Id. at 1006.
Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1176 (5th Cir. 1988).
471 U.S. 707 (1985).
Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1176-78.
471 U.S. at 714.
Id. at 713.
863 F.2d at 1178.
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 219 N.J. Super. 601, 530 A.2d 1287 (App. Div.
116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).

1987),
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v. Lederle Laboratories.3 The holding and implications of Shackil will
be analyzed.
Absence of Collective Liability
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Shackil examined a theory of
collective liability that would expand strict liability against DPT manufacturers in the absence of proof of which manufacturer produced the
DPT vaccine administered to the infant plaintiff. 64 The supreme court
explained the issue as whether New Jersey should substitute a theory of
"market-share" liability for the element of causation-in-fact in a product
liability case involving childhood vaccinations, thereby shifting the burden
of proof on the issue of causation to defendant manufacturers. 6
The action in Shackil was brought by Deanna Marrero and her parents
as a result of a seizure disorder that resulted in chronic encephalopathy
suffered after Deanna's pediatrician, Dr. Feld, administered a final booster
shot of DPT vaccine in 1972. Thirteen years after the inoculation, in
1985, Mrs. Shackil brought this action against Dr. Feld and Lederle after
she became aware of a suspected linkage between Deanna's brain damage
and the pertussis portion of the DPT vaccine.6 Discovery revealed that
Dr. Feld primarily used Lederle's vaccine but used DPT vaccines manufactured by Eli Lilly, Wyeth Laboratories, Parke-Davis and PitmanMoore as well. National Drug Company had also manufactured DPT in
1972 but was not mentioned by Dr. Feld.6 7 Plaintiffs added the additional
manufacturers, except National Drug Company, but could not identify
the manufacturer of the vaccine administered to Deanna. Plaintiffs suffered summary judgment to defendants when they failed to create a
genuine issue of fact on a prima facie element of the case of the identity
of the manufacturer of the DPT dosage. 68 The plaintiffs appealed and
the appellate division reversed, finding a collective liability theory under
what was called "risk-modified market-share," after examining collective
liability theories of concert of action, alternative liability, enterprise liability, and market-share liability.6 9 In rejecting all current theories, the
appellate division selected the risk-modified market-share approach as
most aptly suited to the circumstances of the case and explained its
theory:
A.

plaintiff should first demonstrate that the specific manufacturer of a
defective product proven to have caused the injury can not be identified
and join the manufacturers of a substantial share of the relevant
market defined as all who could have distributed the product to the
plaintiff. Once this has been accomplished, the burden is placed on

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
Id. at 156, 561 A.2d at 512.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
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the defendants to exculpate themselves by proving either non-participation, possession of a reduced market share or that their product
engendered a lower risk. Our aim should be to determine the percentage
of the potential risk to the plaintiff caused by each manufacturer of
the product, and in this respect our resolution of this issue departs
somewhat from a pure market share analysis.70
The lower court presumed to predict what the supreme court would do
if faced with the problem before it. The court noted that rejection of
collective liability theories in total would be an unwarranted deviation
from existing New Jersey Supreme Court precedent which followed states
7
with similar views of tort law. 1
The supreme court took pains to highlight that causation-in-fact was
a fundamental principle of products liability law. Causation-in-fact not
only assigns blameworthiness to culpable parties, but it also limits the
scope of potential liability to encourage useful activity that would not
be pursued if there were excessive exposure to liability. 72 Using traditional
tort analysis from Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts, the court
saw causation-in-fact as "that reasonable connection between the act or
omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has
suffered." 71 The court also extensively examined and then ultimately
rejected the collective liability exceptions to proving causation-in-fact.
1.

Concert of Action
The first theory rejected by both the appellate division and the supreme
court was the concert of action theory that derived from the criminal
concept of aiding and abetting. Both courts relied on Prosser & Keeton's
discussion that permits the allocation of responsibility among several
parties who "in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or
request, or .. . lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoers, or ratify
and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit." 7 4 The supreme
court examined the concerted action liability example from section 876
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, involving a drag race where two
drivers are racing and one collides with and injures a third party. Both
drivers are jointly and severally liable for the injury to the third party
even though only one driver caused the injuries." Courts have applied
this "concert of action" theory in selected DES cases. DES was a synthetic
drug, later believed to be linked to cellular abnormalities, manufactured
76
and prescribed for pregnant women to prevent miscarriages.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 157-58, 561 A.2d at 513-14.
at 157, 561 A.2d at 513.
at 158-59, 561 A.2d at 514-15.
(citing W. KEATON. D. DOnBs, R. KEATON & D. OWEN. PROSSER & KEATON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 323 (5th ed. 1984)).
74. W. KEATON, D. DOBBS, R. KEATON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 323 (5th ed. 1984).
75. 116 N.J. at 159, 561 A.2d at 515; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 at 315-16 (1982).
76. 116 N.J. at 159, 561 A.2d at 515.
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The supreme court rejected the concert of action theory because there
were no allegations of conspiracy by DPT manufacturers nor were there
allegations of any "tacit understanding or common plan" to produce a
defective product or fail to adequately test the vaccine. 7 While DES
manufacturers produced and marketed a generic product with over 200
drug companies using the same formula, DPT vaccine manufacturers
involved in Shackil each used a different process that was separately
licensed by the FDA and protected by patent or trade secret. 78 The court
would not expand the doctrine of collective liability under a concert of
action theory because of the potential for holding any manufacturer liable
for the defective products of an entire industry without demonstration
that the product
causing the injury was made by that defendant man79
ufacturer.
2.

Alternative Liability
Courts have also fashioned collective liability in a product liability
setting under an "alternative liability" theory developed from the negligence action in Summers v. Tice." Section 433(B) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts codified this theory in 1965. The court in Shackil
believed that Summers was the starting point for any analysis of marketshare liability. 8' In Summers two hunters fired their guns at quail, but
in the direction of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was struck in the eye
as the result of only one gunshot. Plaintiff proved that both defendants
were negligent at trial, but he couldn't identify which gunshot struck
him in the eye. The Supreme Court of California, reviewing a verdict
against both defendants, upheld the trial court's relaxation of the causation-in-fact requirement in negligence, holding that it would be unjust
to require a victim to isolate a guilty defendant after proof that both
defendants were negligent.8 2 As a consequence, the burden would be
shifted to each defendant to prove the absence of negligence or suffer
liability for the entire damages.8 3
No court has applied the concept of alternative liability when all culpable
dfendants are not joined in the action.84 The Shackil court noted that
National Drug Company had also manufactured a DPT vaccine in 1972
but had not been joined as a party, defeating the alternative liability
theory under these facts.85 Further, comment g to section 433(B)(3) of

77. Id.
78. Id. at 159-60, 561 A.2d at 515-16. Each lot was separately tested by a division of the FDA.
Id. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516; see 21 C.F.R. § 620.6 (1988).
79. 116 N.J. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516. The California Supreme Court, even in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, did not accept a concert of action theory in a DES case. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 605. 607
P.2d 924, 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141. cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
80. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
81. 116 N.J. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516.
82. 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 3.
83. 116 N.J. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516.
84. Id.; see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
85. 116 N.J. at 157, 561 A.2d at 513.
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the Restatement states that alternative liability has no application where
there is no proof that the conduct of more than one actor has been
tortious, thus leaving the burden of
proof of both tortious conduct and
86
causal relationship to the plaintiff.
3. Enterprise Liability
The lower court in Shackil also addressed the enterprise or industrywide liability theory that imposes liability on all members of an industry
which have produced a product causing a particular harm.817 Proof of a
defective product shifts the burden to all defendants, who then have an
opportunity to exculpate themselves. This collective liability theory has
been described as a hybrid of the concert of action and alternative liability
theories."
The enterprise liability theory was developed in the context of the
blasting-cap industry when six blasting-cap manufacturers and their industry trade association chose not to place warnings directly on each
blasting-cap, one of which injured the plaintiff.8 9 The federal district
court allowed a relaxation of the traditional burden of proving causation
because the manufacturers and trade association "exercised actual collective control over a particular risk-creating product." '9 Neither the
appellate division nor the supreme court discussed the enterprise or
industry-wide liability theory .except as it related to the market-share
theory of liability recognized in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 9'
4.

Market-Share Liability
A general rule of products liability law is that a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant manufacturer actually made the product that caused
the injury. 92 The appellate division, in an attempt to find a remedy for
Deanna Marrero, described the last recognized collective liability theory
as a "market-share" modification of the enterprise or alternative liability
theory. 93 The supreme court discussed the "fashioning of a separate
theory" from alternative liability, called "market-share liability," "which
embodies the concept of 'alternative liability' while eliminating the ne-

86.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 433(B)(3) comment g at 446.

87. 219 N.J. Super. at 624, 530 A.2d at 1299.
88. Id.; see Comment, DES and A Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
Ray. 963, 974 (1978). The theory was described as one which imposes
the industrywide standard ...
[as] the cause of the plaintiff's injury, just as
defendants' joint plan is the cause of injury in the traditional concert of action
plea. Each defendant's adherence perpetuates this standard, which results in the
manufacture of the particular unidentifiable injury-producing product. Therefore,
each industry member has contributed to plaintiff's injury.
Id. at 99"7.
89. Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
90. Id. at 376.
91. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132.
92. Schmidt Y. Archer Iron Works, Inc., 44 lll.2d 401, 256 N.E.2d 6, cert. denied, 398 U.S.
959 (1970).
93. 219 N.J. Super. at 613, 530 A.2d at 1299.
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cessity of joining all possible tortfeasors and the requirement of contemporaneous negligent acts."4 The court found no New Jersey precedent
for adoption of a market-share liablity that would eliminate the requirement of proof of any connection between the defendant and the actual
injury and found no trend in New Jersey toward wholesale adoption of
market-share liability. 9
Turning to other jurisdictions for guidance, the supreme court first
examined the seminal market-share case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,9 a class action suit alleging a design defect against manufacturers
of the synthetic drug DES for injuries sustained in utero.97 The plaintiffs
in Sindell had difficulty identifying the manufacturer who actually produced the injury-causing product because over 200 manufacturers produced
DES from a generic formula prescribed interchangeably. The California
Supreme Court relaxed the traditional tort principle of causation-in-fact,
rather than allow possibly negligent pharmaceutical manufacturers to
escape liability. The court held that the inability to identify the single
defendant was not fatal to plaintiff's case, provided that plaintiff joined
a "substantial share" of manufacturers who produced or supplied "the
DES which her mother might have taken." 9 Without proof of causation,
the burden would shift to defendant manufacturers to prove that they
could not have produced the DES ingested by plaintiff's mother, and if
unable to do so, they would be held liable "for the proportion of the
judgment represented by its share of the market." 99
The court in Shackil recognized that there were two important policy
considerations supporting the Sindell court's decision to expand products
liability theory by applying market-share liability in the absence of causation-in-fact evidence. The first "most persuasive" policy consideration
was the one addressed in Summers v. Tice:
[a]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of injury. Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not
at fault in failing to provide evidence of causation, and although the
absence of such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either,
their conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed
for many years played a significant role in creating the unavailability
of proof.-"'
The second policy consideration from Sindell noted by the court in
Shackil was that a DES manufacturer was in a better position to insure
against the risk of injury so that liability for defects and failure to warn
of harmful effects would provide an incentive for product safety.' 01

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

116 N.J. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516.
116 N.J. at 164-165. 561 A.2d at 520-521.
Id. at 160, 561 A.2d at 516.
Id.
26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 145.

99. Id.
300. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
101. Id.
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The court then reviewed cases which considered market-share theory,
finding that two federal courts had adopted the theory, 02 and the highest
courts of three states had adopted it with modifications. 3 The Supreme
Court of Iowa rejected the theory on grounds of public policy and
legislative deferral,' °4 and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the theory
on grounds that it would discourage desired pharmaceutical research and
development and provide little incentive to provide safer products. 0 5 In
addition, a federal court of appeals refused to apply market-share liability
to DES manufacturers under Maryland and District of Columbia law
because neither state recognized theories allowing the non-identification
of specific defendants.' °
The court in Shackil noted that the Sindell decision had limited acceptance in DES cases and questioned whether the market-share liability
theory was intended to apply beyond DES cases." °" When it was raised
in asbestos litigation, most courts held that the market-share liability
theory was inapplicable for public policy reasons. For example, in Thompson v. Johns-Mansville Corp. the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the
market-share theory because of its radical departure from traditional
theories of tort liability.°8
Three reported decisions addressed market-share liability in vaccine
cases. Only one of the three cases, Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,109 involved a claim of defective design, urged by the plaintiff in
Shackil."0 In Senn, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a market-share
liability theory against two manufacturers on the grounds that "adoption
of any theory of alternative liability requires a profound change in
fundamental tort principles" which should be left to the legislature."'
The two additional vaccine cases discussing market-share liability were
Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co. 12 and Morris v. Parke-Davis & Co.,"' both
distinguished from Senn because they involved manufacturing defects
rather than defective designs. In Sheffield, the California Court of Appeals
highlighted the different application of market-share liability when the
alleged defect related to the method in which the vaccine was processed,

102. 116 N.J. at 161, 561 A.2d at 517 (citing McCormick v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp.
1521 (D. Mass. 1985); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983)).
103. Id. (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 539 N.E.2d
1069. cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 281, 689
P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 826 (1984)).
104. Id. (citing Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986)).
105. Id. (citing Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984)).
106. Id. (citing Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
107. 116 N.J. at 162, 561 A.2d at 517.
108. 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
109. 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988).
110. 116 N.J. at 163, 561 A.2d at 518.
111. 305 Or. at 271, 751 P.2d at 223.
112. 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1988).
113. 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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rather than the defective design of the product as in Sindell. 4 The court
in Sheffield stated it would be unfair to hold four innocent manufacturers
responsible for an injury caused by one tortfeasor claimed to have
manufactured the defective dosage." ' The court in Shackil also noted6
the recent California case of Brown v. Superior Court of California,"
where the court declined to apply a market-share theory of liability to
fraud and breach of warranty claims." 7
5.

Rejection of Risk-Modified Market-Share Liability
After considering collective liability theories, the appellate division in
Shackil adopted a risk-modified market-share theory which, in the context
of collective liability theories without proof of causation, gave a defendant
a fuller opportunity for exculpation." 8 Once a plaintiff has demonstrated
that the manufacturer of a defective product that caused injury cannot
be identified, all manufacturers of a substantial share of the relevant
market should be joined in the lawsuit, placing the burden upon defendants
"to exculpate themselves by proving either non-participation, possession
9
of reduced market share, or that their product engendered a lower risk"."1
The appellate division predicted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
would adopt this collective liability theory, admonishing that "our Supreme Court has been in the forefront of jurisdictions to recognize and
protect those injured by the wrongful acts of others."' 2 0 The court's task
was to employ a theory allowing collective responsibility without proof
of causation while, at the same time, scrupulously protecting the rights
of the defendant manufacturers to exculpate themselves.' 2'
The supreme court rejected the invitation of the appellate division to
place the DPT vaccine with DES risk-modified market-share liability. The
court was unwilling to consider modifying and expanding traditional tort
theory for these design defect claims except as a matter of sound public
policy and only after examining "the general policies that formed the
basis of the Sindell decision as well as the specific policy considerations
that would accompany an expansion of tort law in the context of
22
vaccines. ' 1

114. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 876. The reasoning of the court was:
Here, unlike Sindell, the injuries did not result from the use of a drug generally
defective when used for the purpose it was marketed, but because some manufacturer
made or distributed a defective product. The product that allegedly injured plaintiffs
was itself not a unit of a total generic pharmaceutical product, but a deviant
defective vaccine.
Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 599, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
116 N.J. at 163, 561 A.2d at 518.
219 N.J. Super. at 615, 530 A.2d at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 611, 530 A.2d at 1298.
Id.
Id.
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Addressing the policy considerations underlying Sindell, the court noted
that the negligent defendant should bear the cost of injury as between
it and an innocent plaintiff and that a manufacturer was in a better
position to insure against risk of injury than an innocent purchaser.' 23
Strict liability thus provided an incentive to produce safer products. The
court found these two policy decisions to be inapplicable to the riskmodified market-share theory involving DPT. Instead, the court looked
to see whether DPT was a "generic" product that was uniformly 2harmful
4
and, therefore, like DES, amenable to a market-share analysis.
Although raising this issue of whether DPT was a uniformly harmful
product, the court did not make a finding in this regard and only quoted
statistics that severe injury occurs once in every 110,000 doses of the
vaccine. As between the five DPT manufacturers and the generic nature
of the DPT products, the court recognized that five DPT manufacturers
produced a whole-cell pertussis vaccine in 1972, and one, Eli Lilly,
produced a split-cell vaccine from a chemical formula rather than producing it biologically.' The court therefore refused to sweep all producers
into one market share because the product was not homogeneous, but
left open the question of whether all whole-cell producers could be in
one market share. 2 6 Technical distinctions between DES and DPT unresolved, the court finally addressed the "public-policy and public-health
considerations that would accompany the imposition of market-share
liability.' ' 27
It has been argued that "the common law transformation of product
liability law has not been preceded or accompanied by any detailed
examination of either its distributive or allocative consequences."' 2 Those
major changes in the movement from contract to strict liability were
introduced by common law decisions "without any empirical studies as
to their consequences, and even without any armchair speculation as to
their probable effects."' 29 The supreme court in Shackil, however, did
analyze the consequences of expanding liability concepts in the national
market of vaccines. Before broadening liability to compensate innocent
victims, the court needed to decide whether expanding liability would
serve the goals of public policy and whether "innocent victims [would]
have avenues of legal redress, absent a contrary, overriding public policy.'"10
Arguably, to protect society's interests, the court should modify the

123. Id. at 160-61, 561 A.2d at 516-17.
124. Id. at 165, 561 A.2d at 521.
125. Id. at 165-66, 561 A.2d at 521-522.
126. Id. at 166, 561 A.2d at 522. Because whole-cell products were used interchangeably by
pediatricians, even though they were separately patented or trade-named, the court stated they could
be considered to have their own relevant market. Id.
127. Id.
128. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2193,
2196 (1989).
129. Id.
130. 116 N.J. at 166, 561 A.2d at 522 (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 254-55, 495 A.2d 107 (1985)).
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common law and eliminate "the requirement of privity between the maker
and his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer."' 3 ' The
societal goals of encouraging the use and development of needed drugs,
however, would be thwarted if the court placed unlimited liability on
manufacturers in order to compensate those injured by their products. 3 '
The court viewed the DPT vaccine as a product essential to the public
welfare. An earlier epidemic of pertussis afflicted 265,269 children and
caused 7,518 deaths, whereas vaccine development and countrywide inoculation produced a 99% reduction in the number of reported cases
per 100,000 population between 1943 and 1976.1'" The disease of pertussis,
however, has not been stamped out and continues to pose a threat to
the health of the country's children.
Of greater concern was the threatened supplyoof the DPT vaccine after
Congressional hearings recognizing recent trends in the production and
distribution of DPT. 3 4 The trends included (1) rapidly increasing prices
for vaccines, (2) a decline in the number of companies and organizations
producing and distributing the vaccine with the risk of future interruptions
in supply, and (3) an increasing number of liability lawsuits against
vaccine manufacturers. 3 ' Congressional hearings in 1986 demonstrated to
the court that only two commercial entities producing the DPT vaccine
were left, as compared with five in 1984.116 Those withdrawing from the
DPT market were frank in their reasons, citing "extreme liability exposure,
cost of litigation and the difficulty of continuing to obtain adequate
insurance."''
Because the withdrawal phenomenon was a reality, the two remaining
manufacturers were forced to concentrate on adequate production of
vaccine supplies rather than develop a safer alternative vaccine.' The
market reality for the product from the extreme liability exposure, increased product liability lawsuits, increased costs of insurance and litigation expenses forced the price of DPT from eleven cents a dose in
1984 to $11.40 in 1986.119 Expanded theories of liability, moreover, would
further defer resources from developing a safer alternative vaccine whose
cost is borne by the vaccine manufacturers.
Accepting the overriding public policy of encouraging the development
of necessary drugs and examining the consequences of adding marketshare liability to the field of DPT manufacturing, the court would not

131. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
132. 116 N.J. at 166, 561 A.2d at 522.
133. Id. See Hinman & Koplan, supra note 22, at 3109-13.
134. 116 N.J. at 167, 561 A.2d at 523.
135. Id. See Comm. Print, supra note 23, at 59.
136. Comm. Print, supra note 23, at 68.
137. Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing Before Subcommittee on Health and the Environment
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 295 (Sept. 10, 1984)
(Statement of Daniel Shaw, Jr., Wyeth Laboratories).
138. Comm. Print, supra note 23, at 67-70.
139. Shackil, 116 N.J. at 167, 561 A.2d at 523; Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049,
1064-65, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988) (eight dollars of the 1986 price went
to insurance costs).
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extend this new strict liability theory without proof of causation. The
court looked through the invitation from the appellate division to accept
this "trend" in modern tort law and examined the social policy underlying
it to "guide the development of the common law."' 14 The public policy
that encouraged development of necessary drugs was already embodied
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, giving producers
of unavoidably unsafe products, including vaccines, relief from strict
liability for the unfortunate consequences that might follow their use.
The Restatement required, however, that the product must be properly
prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings to receive
the exemption from strict liability.' 4' The court recognized the Ohio
Supreme Court decision in White v. Wyeth Laboratories,142 granting a
DPT vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories unavoidably unsafe
product status because it was "against the public interest" to stifle medical
research and testing by applying strict liability to these products. Without
classifying the DPT vaccine product manufactured by the defendants in
Shackil as an unavoidably unsafe product, the court relied on the policies
underlying the exemption for unavoidably
unsafe products in the Re43
statement as grounds for its decision.'
B.

Alternative Remedy of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
The court in Shackil had the backdrop of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986'" which provided a new system of vaccineinjury compensation to provide a remedy to those looking for expanded
theories of strict liability. Because of the unique problems presented by
childhood vaccine injuries, including state mandated inoculations before
entry to school, dwindling supplies of the vaccine and the withdrawal
phenomenon from extreme liability exposure, Congress devised a no-fault
compensation scheme to handle vaccine-related injuries. Congress anticipated that the Act would create an environment "under which awards
[could] be made to vaccine injured persons quickly, easily and with
' 5
certainty and generosity."' 1
Part One of the National Vaccine Program begins: "The Secretary
shall establish in the Department of Health and Human Services a national
vaccine program to achieve optimal prevention of human infectious dis-

140. Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 653, 560 A.2d 675, 683 (1989)(Wilentz, C.J., and Giribaldi,
J., concurring).
141. RESTAT MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1979).
142. 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748 (1988).
143. 116 N.J. at 168, 561 A.2d at 524.
144. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-l to 34 (West Supp. 1988) (hereinafter the Act).
145. H. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3. reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADWIN.
NEws 6344 (hereinafter House Report). See generally 38 L. FRUMER & M. FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LL4.Brry § 51.02 (1988) (providing extensive analysis of the Act); Schwartz & Mahshigian, National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48
OHIo ST. L.J. 367 (1987) (examining vaccine-liability crisis and the Act's remedies); Note, The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?. 63
WASH. L. REv. 149 (1988) (addressing the "role of the tort system in the vaccine liability crisis"
and the probable success of the Act in resolving that crisis).
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eases through immunization and to achieve optimal prevention against
adverse reactions to vaccines.'"4 The court in Shackil reviewed features
of the Act that discussed petitioning the claims court for a vaccine-related
injury and the different manner of compensation for injuries from vaccines
administered before October 1, 1988, including the ability of those presently in civil litigation to withdraw from their lawsuits to file a petition
under the NCVI.' 4 7 The court also examined the legislative history of the
Act and found that the drafters envisioned an easy remedy "for plaintiffs
who would otherwise engage in protracted litigation against a vaccine
manufacturer with a consequent risk of being denied recovery because
of failure to prove the prima facie elements of a tort law cause of
action".'1 The court noted that, "The compensation scheme contained
in the Act therefore does away with the traditional tort-law requirements
of proof with respect to causation, injury, negligence and defect."' 49
Congress, therefore, rather than the court, should recognize a theory of
collective liability, because the NCVI would not require identification of
the manufacturer.'5 0 The Act would be funded by an excise tax on the
manufacturers of childhood vaccines, which tax would "generate sufficient
annual income for the [National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust]
fund to cover all costs of compensation.""' At the time of the Shackil
decision Congress had appropriated up to $80 million for pre-Act vaccine
injuries, permitting the court to find that the Act enjoyed sufficient
funding which would be maintained by Congress in the future.' 52 This
tax can be viewed as a safety tax added to the price of the vaccine,
collected and paid by manufacturers to a compensation fund that would
be used to pay out claims awarded under the NCVI to infants receiving
vaccine-related injuries.153 This excise tax or safety tax would increase
the price of the DPT vaccine but ultimately would be collected and
administered by a national program that would award those injured by
rare reactions to the vaccine.
The court was convinced that the NCVI, in addition to serving the
goal of compensation to injured vaccinees, was also passed to protect
the unstable vaccine market by encouraging vaccine manufacturers to
continue to produce supply. The court quoted from the legislative history
of the Act:
[t]he loss of any of the existing manufacturers of childhood vaccines
at this time could create a genuine public health hazard in this country.
146. 42 U.S.C.A. 300aa-1.
147. 116 N.J. at 169, 561 A.2d at 525.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 170, 561 A.2d at 526.
151. House Report, supra note 145, at 34.
152. 116 N.J. at 169, 561 A.2d at 525.
153. Cf. Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of Modem Tort, 10 CA.DOzo L. REV. 2263
(1989). The added cost of all goods because of liability exposure and tort liability was labeled a
tax on goods collected and disbursed through litigation. Id. at 2264. Huber's safety tax accounts
for over 95% of the price of childhood vaccines even before imposition of the excise tax under
the NCVI. Id. at 2263.
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Currently there [are] . . . two manufacturers of the DPT vaccine ...
[t]he withdrawal of even a single manufacturer would present the very
real possibility 'of vaccine shortages, and in turn increasing numbers
of unimmunized children, and perhaps, a resurgence of preventable
diseases. '

To further improve stability in the vaccine market and continue its
supply, all victims injured after 1988 were required to initially prosecute
their claim under the NCVI before pursuing a separate cause of action
under tort law.'"5 Those victims injured before 1988 had the option of
filing a claim under the NCVI, but the Act did not allow double recovery
56
if the victim agreed to accept the compensation award under the NCVI.
Therefore, the NCVI would lessen the number of lawsuits against manufacturers because of the expected acceptance of no fault compensation
under the Act. Even in Shackil, the plaintiffs had the option of withdrawing their state tort claims without prejudice and filing a claim for
compensation under the Act, but they did not choose that avenue. 57 The
risk selected by the plaintiffs to pursue their tort claim under a collective
liability theory which ultimately failed, thus leaving them remedyless, was
willingly assumed and was not a ground for allowing market-share liability
or any modification of collective liability theories.
In the absence of the NCVI, a vaccine liability crisis would continue.
The court in Shackil saw the Act's existence as critical to the accomplishment of the public policy goal of continued production of the DPT
5 Although not
vaccine.'1
a substitute for expanded tort law theory that
would occur with risk-modified market-share liability, the Act made
available compensatory relief that was certain, and satisfied the tort goal
of encouraging safer products by establishing "a national program for
the research and development of safer vaccines."'' 9 Because of the comprehensive nature of the NCVI, the issues of federal preemption were
raised but unresolved by Shackil.
IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF NCVI IN
STATE TORT LAW CLAIMS
At the time the appellate division decided Shackil and recognized riskmodified market-share liability for DPT manufacturers, the courts were
split on whether federal law would preempt state law tort claims involving
injuries from DPT vaccines.'1° Federal preemption is premised on the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, article VI, clause 2,
which provides "[Tihe Constitution and the laws of the United States,

154. House Report, supra note 145, at 7.
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11.
156. 116 N.J. at 170, 561 A.2d at 526.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 170-71, 561 A.2d at 526-527.
159. Id. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.
160. See Note, DPT Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Federal Preemption Reconsidered, 41
L. REv. 373, 384-93 (1988).
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which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding.' 61 The doctrine dates back to Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons
v. Ogden'6 where the Court struck down a state statute which was in
opposition to a federal statute. Federal preemption can be either express
or implied. Most federal statutes do not explicitly preempt state action
and, therefore, federal preemption arguments focus on whether implied
federal preemption exists. 63 Certain interests, which demand uniformity
in our federalist society to achieve vital national interests, require the
removal of conflicting state legislative enactments or state judicial remedies
from inquiring juries.16'
The arguments for federal preemption were rejected in MacGillivray
v. Lederle Laboratories,65 which was typical of district court decisions
at the time. In MacGillivray, the court held that comprehensive federal
regulations for marketing and design of prescription drugs, including the
pertussis vaccine, did not preempt the state's strict products liability law
from applying to defective design of the vaccine.'6 The court suggested
in MacGillivray, however, that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act "may indeed serve to prevent future injured parties from bringing
' 67
state claims based on defective design."'
The court in Shackil separately addressed the federal preemption issue
of state tort law claims after reviewing the reversal of two court decisions
finding federal preemption initially. 1' The court was satisfied that Hurley
v. Lederle Laboratories69 and Abbot v. American Cyanamid70 thoroughly
examined the issue of federal preemption by the NCVI and concurred
that the Act "does not expressly or impliedly preempt traditional state
tort law claims.' ' 7' The issue of blanket federal preemption by implication
of this comprehensive Act, therefore, was well-settled.
It does appear, however, that selective federal preemption will be
recognized in a claim of product liability for a defect in design by
inadequate warning.'7 The court in Shackil recognized in the provisions

161. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
162. 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat) (1824).
163. Michigan Canners & Freezers Assoc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
469 (1984).

164. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also Graves v. Walton
County Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.
1969) (preemption doctrine keystone in U.S. federalist system of government).
165. 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987).
166. Id. at 746.
167. Id. at 746 ("Congress has quite recently chosen to address one important legal and public
health issue raised by suits against vaccine manufacturers wherein certain aspects of state tort law
are in fact preempted.")
168. 116 N.J. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.
169. 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1988).
170. 844 F.2d 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988).
171.

116 N.J. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.

172. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-22(b)(l), (2).
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of the NCVI and in the pronouncements in MacGillivray that certain
aspects of state tort law are preempted:
The Act does, however, limit state tort claims based on an injury
arising after the effective date of compensation program, to the extent
that it codifies comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 42
U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(1), and creates a presumption that the vaccine's
warning was valid73if it complied with FDA requirements. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300aa-22(b)(2).1

The general rule of no federal preemption is stated in the Act at 42
U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(a): "[E]xcept as provided in subsections (b) (c) and
(e) of this section, state law shall apply to a civil action brought for
damages for a vaccine-related injury or death." The exceptions to application of state law are contained in subsection 300aa-22(b)(1):
(1) No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with
the administration of a vaccine after the effective date of this subpart,
if the injury or death resulted from side-affects that were unavoidable,
even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied
by proper directions and warnings, and
(2) for purposes of paragraph (1) a vaccine shall be presumed to be
accompanied by proper directions and warnings, if the vaccine manufacturer shows that it complied in all material respects with the
requirements under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, [21
U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.] and Section 262 of this title ....
The presumption from the Act is that protection under section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts would be given to a DPT vaccine
that was not negligently produced or marketed without warnings. Further,
the presumption is that FDA approval of the vaccine's warning exempts
the manufacturer from a claim of defective design by inadequate warning.
The exceptions to selected federal preemption under the Act were premised
on activity supporting claims for punitive damages as included in section
300aa-23(d)(2), including fraud or intentional withholding of information
under the approval process or relating to the vaccine's safety and effectiveness of the vaccines. A second exception permitted civil liability
for damages if the plaintiff could prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care, even though it complied
with the Act. 174 Therefore, the DPT vaccine is one of several under the
NCVI that can qualify for unavoidably unsafe product status and have
FDA approval of its warning as federal preemption of a state law tort
claim for defective design.
V. CONCLUSION
Market-share liability theory is an expansion of strict liability theory
because it removes the essential tort element of causation. Manufacturers

173. 116 N.J. at 171, 561 A.2d at 527.
174. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-22(b)(2)(A), (B).
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would be subject to greater potential liability under this theory, beyond
traditional products liability because any injury to a person who consumed,
used, or came into contact with a product alleged to be defective would
subject those manufacturers producing that product to risk. The injured
person could join all manufacturers of that product in the industry and
allege their market-share liability, rather than alleging product liability
from producing an allegedly defective product that caused injury.
The risk-modified market-share liability theory, proposed by the appellate division in Shackil, expands strict products liability, but gives
manufacturers of a substantial market share a greater opportunity to
defend themselves if they can prove nonparticipation, possession of a
reduced market share, or lower risk of injury accompanying their products.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Shackil, however, refused to expand
strict liability theory in the market of DPT vaccines. While Sindell
expanded product liability theory by adopting the policy that a defendant
manufacturer should bear the cost of injury as between it and an innocent
plaintiff because a manufacturer could better insure against risk of injury
than an innocent purchaser, the Shackil court did not view DPT vaccine
as a uniformly harmful product that should be subject to market-share
analysis. Since market-share liability had limited acceptance in the DES
cases and little success outside of Sindell, the court in Shackil closely
examined societal goals and public policy.
The New Jersey Supreme Court was more concerned with the consequences of expanding liability concepts for the national market of
vaccines that included only two manufacturers of the DPT vaccine.
Although the percentage of the market share of the two manufacturers,
Lederle and Connaugh, is not known, there would be little incentive for
continued production of the DPT vaccine if each -could be held liable
for their respective market share from an adverse reaction when their
vaccine may not have caused injury. More difficult market-share arguments are .raised where the respective manufacturer could have produced
forty percent of the relevant market of DPT vaccine at the time of the
inoculation, but because of the withdrawal phenomenon, be left with
eighty percent of the national market at the time allegations are formulated
by the injured vaccinee and representatives. Even though the risk-modified
market-share theory permits the showing of a reduced market share, the
manufacturer would be put to the burden of establishing its market share
again in the absence of proof of causation in fact between its product
and the adverse reaction to the vaccine.
Further expansion of the field of DPT vaccines or the return to the
DPT vaccine market by withdrawing firms would be discouraged if those
manufacturers could be exposed to market-share liability without proof
of cause-in-fact. By maintaining the essential element of cause-in-fact for
strict liability actions and not allowing unlimited liability for injury because
one is in the business of manufacturing a DPT vaccine, the court gives
Lederle and Connaugh some incentive to continue producing the DPT
vaccine and other manufacturers can consider reentry into the DPT
market.
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Instead of further threatening the DPT vaccine supply, and cognizant
of ihe crisis that shortages in supply would create, the court in Shackil
on public policy grounds sought to encourage continued production of
the DPT vaccine and re-entry to the market so that manufacturers could
use funds otherwise diverted for unlimited liability exposure risks for
research and development of safer drugs.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act provides a new system of
vaccine-injury compensation. The Act provides no-fault remedies to injured vaccinees, instead of expanding strict liability theory as fashioned
in Sindell, "to further the risk spreading and deterrence goals of modern
products liability law."'7 While "trends" could be recognized, the Shackil
court gave thought and consideration to the social policy underlying the
common law which, in this case, was the overriding public policy of
encouraging and developing necessary drugs and preserving the supply
of DPT vaccines to guard against a whooping cough epidemic. Rather
than expand liability exposure for DPT manufacturers, the court recognized the NCVI as a program to compensate injured vaccinees, while
still preserving traditional tort remedies in the state law context for a
vaccinee dissatisfied with an NCVI award. Although courts have not
recognized blanket federal preemption under the NCVI, selected federal
preemption can be premised on proof of unavoidable, unsafe product
status for a product prepared with due care and accompanied by a
warning approved by the FDA. The combination of the refusal to expand
strict liability theory in Shackil and the passage and funding of the NCVI
can only create a more healthy environment for the DPT vaccine market
and children exposed to the risk of the pertussis disease.
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